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MORTGAGES - LIEN AND PRIORITY - MORTGAGES AND
MECHANICS' LIENS
Wayne Building & Loan Co. v. Yarborough,
11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 228 N.E.2d 841 (1967).
Ohio courts have long been among a minority in holding that
constructive notice, rather than actual notice, is sufficient to defeat
the priority of nonobligatory' future advance mortgages.2  The re-
cent case of Wayne Building & Loan Co. v. Yarborough3 upheld
-this position, and, in addition, declared that a construction mort-
gagee who makes future advances conditioned upon the satisfactory
progression of work is not deemed to have been under an obligation
to make such advances.4
Wayne's importance is not simply its impressive and exhaustive
treatment of mortgage law. More importantly, the case narrows
the gap which exists between the common law and the statutory
treatment of liens and priorities in Ohio.
A contract for the purchase of land and the construction of a
house generated the series of transactions which culminated in this
litigation. The complex facts of the case are most clearly viewed
from a time sequence approach as follows:5
August 28, 1963. Yarborough, the builder, and the Lantzes,
the ultimate purchasers of the house, entered into a written agree-
ment whereby Yarborough proposed to purchase the land for the
Lantzes from Sauter, the developer of the community, and to con-
struct a house upon it. The Lantzes executed a cognovit note to
Yarborough for $8,000.
October 11, 1963. The Lantzes paid to Yarborough $4,000 of
the $8,000 downpayment.
October 16, 1963. Yarborough informed the developer of his
contract with the Lantzes, whereupon the developer approved the
1 A nonobligatory future advance mortgage consists of a series of optional payments
by the mortgagee to the mortgagor, each payment being a separate promise supported
by its own consideration. See G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 114 (1951) [hereinafter
cited as OSBORNE). An obligatory mortgage arises when the mortgagee is firmly bound
to advance monies in accordance with the original mortgage agreement. A nonobliga-
tory mortgage does not bind the mortgagee. For a discussion of the theories which
make these distinctions, and a criticism of these theories, see id. §§ 117, 117a.
2 See Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 179 (1961).
3 11 Ohio St 2d 195, 228 N.E.2d 841 (1967).
4Id. at 221, 228 N.E.2d at 858.
GId. at 198, 228 N.E.2d at 844-45.
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plans for the Lantzes' house, and deeded the lot to Yarborough in
return for $1,000 cash and a promissory note for $4,600.
Yarborough, in order to raise construction money, then applied
to Wayne Building and Loan for a $22,000 mortgage loan. Wayne
Building and Loan valued the land at $6,0006 and the proposed
house at $24,000. Yarborough informed Wayne of his transac-
tions with the developer and the Lantzes, and Wayne Building and
Loan approved the plans for the house.
October 24, 1963. As security for his promissory note of Oc-
tober 16 for the purchase of the lot, Yarborough executed, but did
not record, an ordinary mortgage to the developer.
October 31, 1963. Yarborough entered into a formal construc-
tion mortgage arrangement with Wayne Building and Loan.'
November 1, 1963. Wayne Building and Loan recorded its
October 31 mortgage agreement with Yarborough.
November 21, 1963. Construction on the Lantzes' house com-
menced thus setting the priority date for mechanics' liens?
December 11, 1963. The developer filed his October 24 pur-
chase money mortgage. His warranty deed to Yarborough was also
filed, immediately followed by Wayne Building and Loan's refil-
ing ° of its October 31 mortgage deed to perfect the chain of title.
Subsequent to December 11, 1963. Wayne Building and Loan
6 Wayne Building and Loan actually appraised the value of the land at $5,500. Re-
cord at 34, Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 228 N.E.2d 841
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Record].
7 The evidence did not prove that Wayne Building and Loan knew the amount of
the downpayment given, nor knew that the Lantzes, specifically, gave the downpayment.
11 Ohio St. 2d at 201-02, 228 N.E.2d at 847.8 Other papers were signed including an assignment of funds agreement and a me-
chanics' lien agreement Record at 25.
0 The construction was done by Prior Homes, Inc., Yarborough's wholly owned
general contractor. Labor and materials were contracted for by Yarborough himself,
acting both as an officer of Prior Homes, Inc., and as an owner of the realty.
10 The refiling was necessary because Wayne Building and Loan's mortgage was
out of the chain of title. The argument made in the court was that under OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 1311.13(B), 5301.23 (Page 1962), the first filing was invalid. The
court held that Wayne's first recording was sufficient. It reasoned that the mechanics'
lienors claimed through Yarborough, since he had contracted for the labor and material.
The lienors, if they had checked the record, would have found Yarborough's mortgage
to Wayne Building and Loan. Merely because the warranty deed was unrecorded at the
time did not mean that the lienors could ignore the mortgage. The record would have
put them on inquiry as to whether Yarborough really owned the land. This fact could
easily be discovered by asking Yarborough. It was the duty of the mechanics' lienors
to know when the person through whom they claimed had acquired tide. Their failure
to do so was not the fault of Wayne Building and Loan, whose mortgage was properly
recorded. See generally OSBORNE § 197.
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disbursed $18,500 to Yarborough in aceordance with its lending
agreement.
11
March 10, 1964. The Lantzes paid $4,000 to Yarborough to
fulfill their downpayment obligation.
April 1964. The Lantzes first learned of Yarborough's previ-
ous dealings with the developer and Wayne Building and Loan.
June 1964. The building and loan company, having learned
that Yarborough was in financial distress and that he had used the
mortgage money to pay past indebtedness, filed an action for fore-
closure and the marshalling of liens against Yarborough.
The Lantzes appealed to the supreme court from findings of the
lower courts giving lowest priority to their vendee's lien."2 In re-
versing the decisions of the lower courts, the supreme court held
that the priorities should have been as follows:'"
1) The Lantzes' vendee's lien for the $4,000 which they paid
on the land purchase contract before construction began.
2) The mechanics' lienors.
3) The Lantzes' vendee's lien for $4,000 paid on the contract
after construction had begun.
4) The developer, in the amount of his purchase money mort-
gage lien.
5) Wayne Building and Loan, in the amount of its mortgage
lien.
Whether the Ohio Supreme Court reached the correct result
through valid reasoning, and whether the court's holding engenders
sound precedent, are two separate propositions. It must be acknowl-
edged that statutory amendments' 4 since the case arose could have
produced different results. But this does not concern the Lantzes'
vendee's lien, as the changes would affect only the nature of the
building and loan company's obligation on the construction mort-
gage.
The Lantzes claimed a vendee's lien of $8,000. Their argu-
ment" was based upon the premise that a vendee of a land contract
can protect his interest through possession or recordation. But in
11 The court found that this money was used by Yarborough to pay past indebted-
ness. 11 Ohio St. 2d at 210, 228 N.E.2d at 852.
12 1d. at 198, 228 NE.2d at 845.
13 Id. at 222, 228 N.E.2d at 859.
14Omuo REv. CODE §§ 5301.232.233 (1967 CCH ADvANcE SESS. LAWs, SEN-
ATE BILLs 605-07 (effective Nov. 24, 1967)), amendizg OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
5301.23 (Page 1962).
15 Brief for Appellant Lantz at 7, Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio
St. 2d 195, 228 N.Y.2d 841 (1967).
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the common real estate purchase agreement, such as found here, the
vendee can comply with neither act; he has no title to record and
no right to possession until he has paid the purchase price in full.16
The court followed this line of reasoning in acknowledging the
Lantzes' vendee's lien. Insofar as the purchase agreement was not
recordable, the rights of the parties were to be established by gen-
eral principles of law and equity.'7
In reversing the lower courts,'8 the supreme court found that
the two intervening mortgagees had sufficient knowledge of Yar-
borough's transaction with the Lantzes to put them on inquiry.
Though the developer had actual knowledge of the Lantzes' con-
tract with Yarborough, the building and loan company knew only
that Yarborough had contracted with some party for the sale of the
land and construction of a house upon it. The court held 9 that be-
cause both mortgagees at least had knowledge of facts sufficient to
put them on inquiry, they were not bona fide purchasers and thus
could not cut off the Lantzes' prior equitable lien. The fact that a
portion of the purchase price was paid after the developer and the
building and loan company had recorded their mortgages was of no
consequence because the vendee's lien was outside the ambit of the
recording act and could only be cut off by actual notice to the ven-
dee before his payments were made.2"
While it was only fair for the court to give effect to the Lant-
zes' vendee's lien, the holding dearly applies only when the vendee
has no knowledge of any mortgages, and when the mortgagees can
also be charged with knowledge of the vendee's lien. If the facts
were altered so that the building and loan company and the de-
veloper had had no knowledge of the contracts Yarborough had
made, it would appear that the developer would have had priority
over the Lantzes because of his purchase money mortgage. But
could the court then have held as to the building and loan that it
16 8A G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 4449 (1957).
17 11 Ohio St. 2d at 200, 228 N.E.2d at 846.
18 The common pleas court agreed with Wayne that it recorded and gave value un-
der its mortgage without knowledge of the Lantzes' contract. The court of common
pleas found that "the Lantzes had failed 'to show any knowledge of an outstanding
contract of the vendee upon the part of the mortgagee in this case.'" Id. at 201, 228
N.E.2d at 846. The court of appeals narrowed this holding and found that while
Wayne Building and Loan may have had constructuve notice of the Lantzes' contract
with Yarborough, this knowledge was not legally sufficient to defeat its priority over
the prior equitable lien of the buyer. Id.
19 Id. at 204-05, 228 N.E.2d at 848-49.
20 Id. at 203, 228 N.E.2d at 848.
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should have asked, in its loan application, who owned the house or
lot, and whether any interests were outstanding? It would certainly
seem fair to place this burden on the mortgagee rather than upon
an unwary home buyer. It seems clear from the court's holding
that the building and loan company and the developer should have
both conducted an inquiry as to the Lantzes' interest in the prop-
erty. Such an inquiry would have reasonably led them to contact
the Lantzes and ask them to subordinate their interest to that of the
mortgages. The effect would have been that the Lantzes would
have then had actual knowledge of the mortgages. Under the
Wayne holding as to future payments, the Lantzes' lien would then
have been subordinate whether or not they consented.
In deciding the Lantzes' interest as against the mechanics' lien-
ors, the court held21 that because the Lantzes paid out $4,000 prior
to the beginning of construction, they were entitled to priority to
the extent of this amount over the mechanics' lienors. The Ohio
Revised Code22 provides that mechanics' liens attach at the com-
mencement of construction. The statutes favor the mechanics'
lienors against any subsequent payments by the vendee of a land
contract whether or not the vendee had any knowledge of the com-
mencement of construction.2" It is not necessary -to point out the
reasons for this section except to note that most home buyers are
aware of when construction begins. Placing the burden on me-
chanics' lienors to discover who the beneficial owner of the future
house may be, is a hardship if -the vendor contracts for labor and
materials. The court therefore awarded the mechanics' lienors pri-
ority for the half of the $8000 which was paid after construction
had commenced.2"
The relative priorities among the mechanics' lienors, the de-
veloper, and the building and loan company presented a more com-
plex problem to the court, partially, at least, because Ohio employs
essentially a "race" scheme of priorities. In Ohio, mortgages be-
come effective on the date submitted for recording and in -the order
submitted should more than one mortgage be submitted on the
same day.25 A mortgage recorded prior -to the commencement of
211d. at 205-06, 228 N.E.2d at 849.
2 2 OHIo Rv. CODE ANN. §§ 1311.02, .13 (Page 1962).
23d. § 1311.13(B).
24 11 Ohio. St. 2d at 222, 228 N.E.2d at 859.
25 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5301.23 (Page Supp. 1966).
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construction generally is accorded priority over mechanics' liens.26
An exception to this "race" scheme arises when the mortgage is re-
corded subsequent to the commencement of construction, and, there-
fore, after the mechanics' liens had attached to the land."
Essentially, the building and loan company employed the bene-
fits of two distinct theories to defeat the mechanics' liens. It rea-
soned that if its first recording (November 1) were valid, and there
was an obligation to advance monies to Yarborough, then its lien
was not subject to intervening claimants. If, however, the second
recording (December 11) were valid, then it would be within the
purview of the statutory improvement mortgage section 8 and would
defeat the mechanics' liens. As to its second contention, there was
formal compliance with the requirements necessary for the face of
the mortgage,29 but no evidence was offered to show compliance
with the statutory scheme for disbursements."0 This defect was fa-
tal because under the statutory improvement mortgage scheme, a
mortgagee can gain priority over mechanics' liens even though the
mortgage is recorded subsequent to the beginning of work, if the
mortgagee follows a special scheme for disbursements.3 The mort-
26Id. § 1311.13(B) (Page 1962).
27 See id. § 1311.14.
28 ld.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 The statute provides:
(A) Said mortgagee may at any time pay off said prior encumbrance, or
withhold the amount thereof for that purpose.
(B) Out of the residue of said fund such mortgagee may at any time re-
tain sufficient funds to complete the improvement, according to the original
plans, specifications, and contracts, and within the original contract price.
(C) Such mortgagee may from time to time pay out on the owner's order,
directly to contractors or subcontractors, or to the owner himself if he is his
own contractor, such sums as said owner certifies to be necessary to meet and
pay labor payrolls for said improvement.
(D) Such mortgagee shall pay on the order of the owner, the accounts of
such materialmen and laborers as have filed with such mortgagee a written
notice as provided in this section, the amounts due for material then furnished
and labor then performed ... and shall retain out of said mortgage fund such
money to become due as is shown by said notice so served and shall hold such
money, and shall pay on the order of the owner, the amounts due to such
persons who have served such notices, if said mortgagee has sufficient money
in his hands to do so and also to complete said improvement-, but if such
mortgagee has funds in his hands insufficient to pay all such laborers and
materialmen in full and to complete said improvement, he shall retain suffi-
dent to complete said improvement and to distribute the balance pro rata
among the materialmen and laborers who have filed such notices.
(E) If such owner refuses to issue an order to pay the amount of such
notice filed, said mortgagee shall retain the whole amount claimed until the
proper amount has been agreed upon or judicially determined; provided that
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gagee gains priority, because he must pay the mechanics' lienors di-
rectly so that they are in no worse position. The theory behind this
approach is to encourage a mortgagee to loan funds where construc-
tion has already been started but the owner lacks the necessary funds
to proceed further." The express condition though is that the la-
borers and materialmen must be paid out of the mortgage fund.
The building and loan company did not comply with the disburse-
ment scheme, and to allow it priority under the statute would have
been to deprive the materialmen of their earnings."o
said mortgagee may withhold sufficient funds to complete said improvement.
(F) Such mortgagee shall pay out on the owner's order, directly to ma-
terialmen or laborers who have performed labor or furnished material for said
improvement.
(G) Such mortgagee shall pay the balance of said mortgage fund after said
improvement is completed to the owner, or to whomsoever such owner directs.
This section... shall be liberally construed in favor of such mortgagees, a
substantial compliance by such mortgagees being sufficient. Id.
3 2 In the early part of the century if a mortgage were filed after construction had
been begun, a case could arise whereby a mechanic's lien could be filed for work per-
formed after recordation of the mortgage and still be prior to the mortgages. This was
because mechanics' liens related back to the time of the original construction. See Rider
v. Crobaugh, 100 Ohio St. 88, 125 N.E. 130 (1919). This situation most often arose
when one's premises were being improved, rather than constructed. The Ohio Legisla-
ture had two basic choices; they could have stated that liens could not attach at the com-
mencement of construction, but rather when each laborer begins his specific task
While it would be difficult to determine when each laborer had commenced, it would
have prevented a lien from arising perhaps as much as a year or more before the actual
work was performed. The other alternative was to adopt a scheme such as OmIo REv.
CODE ANN. § 1311.13 (Page 1962), which in part provides:
Such liens shall be preferred to all other titles, liens, or encumbrances which
may attach to or upon such construction, excavation, machinery, or improve-
ment, or to or upon the land upon which they are situated, which shall either
be given or recorded subsequent to the commencement of said construction,
excavation, or improvement. Id. § 1311.13(B) (emphasis added).
Rider pointed out that before the Legislature had acted in this matter, when a lien
was placed on the premises this had the effect of stopping the work entirely, because few
mortgagees would be willing to risk a mortgage on property already secured. 100 Ohio
Sr. at 99, 125 N.E. at 133.
Perhaps the difficulty today, construing § 1311.14 as applying to mortgages recorded
after the commencement of construction, arose from the language in Rider when the
court stated that "an inspection of the entire act, however, would dearly indicate that
the legislative intention was to apply its force only to mortgages which were given and
filed for the purpose of improving real estate, after the actual commencement of op-
erations." Id. at 98, 125 N.E. at 133 (emphasis added). Professor Shanker feels that
this holding was clearly a mistake. Interview with Morris G. Shanker, Professor of
Law, Case Western Reserve University, in Cleveland, Ohio, October 16, 1967. Profes-
sor Shanker's argument has much validity, and would have the effect of requiring all
mortgagees to disburse in the manner set forth in Orno REv. CODE. ANN. § 1311.14
(Page 1962). This would protect all parties involved by making sure that the mortgage
funds were, in fact, properly disbursed. See text accompanying note 57 infra
33 An interesting facet of the case is that the building and loan company had two al-
ternatives by which to defeat mechanics' liens. Disregarding this strange factual situa-
tion, the question arises that if its first recording had been valid by including the deed,
could the building and loan company then rerecord and claim to be under section 1311.
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Because this case arose before amendments to the Ohio Revised
Code,34 the court was able to hold that if the building and loan com-
pany were not under an obligation to disburse the monies under
the mortgage loan to Yarborough, then each advance made after
construction had begun would be subsequent in priority to valid me-
chanics' liens. 5 The problem is whether or not the court was cor-
rect in holding the advances to be optional. The reasoning used
was that because there was no express agreement between mort-
gagor and mortgagee requiring the mortgagee "to advance a certain
and 'definite sum, in a particular manner ... ."" the payments of
monies to Yarborough were nonobligatory. The evidence discussed
by the court 7 at least proves that the mortgagee did have some dis-
cretion as to whether the building was progressing satisfactorily
enough for further payments. But was this sort of discretionary
policy enough to make the loan advances optional; or was the mort-
gagee merely reserving this discretion out of commercial necessity?
Considering the October 31, 1963 note between the building
and loan company and Yarborough,"3 the mortgage deed between
these parties, 9 and Yarborough's assignment of funds to the mort-
gagee," it is difficult to understand how the court found no obliga-
tions on the part of the mortgagee to make future advances. The
promissory note4 named a definite total sum as a present loan.
While this could be considered an intentional misrepresentation of
facts, a majority of the courts hold this to be a valid mortgage not
only between the mortgagor and the mortgagee, but as against credi-
tors and subsequent encumbrancers" As one writer in the field
states, "[Tihe business advantages of such a useful device outweigh
14. Rider seems to answer in the negative. The benefit of two recordings would ac-
crue to the mortgagee who could not be sure that his advances would be treated by the
courts as obligatory. Thus, if the courts found the advances not to be obligatory, the
mortgagee could then claim first priority if he had complied with section 1311.14 by
recording after construction had commenced and complying with that section's disburse-
ment scheme.
34 OHIO REV. CODE §§ 5301.232-.233 (1967 CCH ADvANcE SEss. LAWS, SENATE
BILLS 605-07 (effective Nov. 24, 1967)), amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 5301.23
(Page 1962).
35 See 11 Ohio St. 2d at 219, 228 N.E.2d at 857.
36 Id. at 220, 228 N.E.2d at 858.
37 Id. at 221, 228 N.E.2d at 858.
38 Record at 19.
39 Id. at 20.
40 Id. at 25.
41 11 Ohio St. 2d at 221, 228 N.E.2d at 858.
42OSBORNE § 116.
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any possible dangers and objections involved in its employment."4
The assignment of funds to the building and loan company44 had
the effect of placing this money in escrow with a third party and
saving Yarborough interest expense until the money was actually
disbursed.45 But this in no way makes for any less of an obligation
on the part of the mortgagee to pay out the funds.
The supreme court argued that the mortgagee's wide discretion
made the loan one which had to be considered optional. In the
companion case the court placed great emphasis on the fact that the
mortgagee had unilaterally reduced the upper limit on the loan.46
Whatever the reasons behind the mortgagee's unilateral action
to reduce the amount of the loan, it does not necessarily follow that
the mortgagee could, under its agreement, do so. The fact that
Yarborough did not bring an action for a breach of the agreement
does not mean that he did not have such a cause of action against
the mortgagee.
The better way to view the construction mortgage agreement
would be as a series of payments each upon a condition precedent.47
The obligation arose with the original note and mortgage, and con-
tinued as long as construction proceeded properly. If Yarborough
had said that a certain portion of the house was completed and that
he therefore needed funds, could the mortgagee have refused? As
long as the event, progress on the building, arose, there was an ob-
ligation to disburse a portion of the funds. "[Wihere it appears as
a matter of law .. .that the ... mortgagee may decline to make
advances at his pleasure, without taking the risk of subjecting him-
self to damages or loss ... "48 the mortgagee will lose his priority
for the advances made after he had knowledge of the mechanics'
liens. The building and loan company made no advances prior to
the commencement of construction, and was, therefore, subjected to
the last priority. Yet his mortgage was recorded prior to the begin-
ning of -the work. The court tended to neglect not only the sanc-
43 ld. at 283.
44 Record at 25.
4 5 
of interest here is the nature of the Mechanics' Lien Agreement which makes it
Yarboroughs' responsibility to guard against mechanics' liens, and which states that the
funds are in escrow at The Wayne Agency Co. Record at 25. For a discussion of the
escrow theory see OSBORNE § 115.
46 Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio St. 2d 224, 226-27, 228 N.E.
2d 860, 862 (1967).
47 See A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 628 (one volume ed. 1952).
48 In re Mayerhofer's Estate, 43 Misc. 2d 32, 33, 249 N.Y.S.2d 896-97 (Sup. Ct.
1964).
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tity of the binding agreement between the mortgagee and Yarbor-
ough, but the fact that the building and loan company may have
had to make future advances in order to protect its initial invest-
ment.4" The new amendment to the Ohio Revised Code50 seems to
support the obligatory nature of the agreement."'
The obligatory-nonobligatory distinction merely penalizes the
mortgagee who does not appear to be disbursing funds in the proper
manner. Certainly, such a mortgagee should be penalized at least
to the extent that other lienholders would be deprived of their rights
when they follow the statutory schemes. Yet the court should not
have reasoned that future payments were optional. A better argu-
ment could have been made on the basis just mentioned; if a mort-
gagee is negligent with the funds his interest should give way to
other lienors. While this may be considered a windfall to other
creditors, it is less of a windfall than allowing third parties to bene-
fit from the court's analysis. If mechanics' lienors who have per-
fected their liens gain priority over a mortgagee, it is not because of
anything which they have done. Rather, it is because a court has
subsequently stated that an agreement was optional.
If the agreement were obligatory, nothing could intervene to
affect the mortgagee's priority.52 It would be inequitable in the
sense that Wayne Building and Loan would have been in breach of
contract had it decided that because of liens it would not risk the
loss. Yet accepting the court's view that the advances were merely
optional, constructive notice was enough to defeat the priorities of
the mortgagee's advances. Recognizing that the majority rule is
49 See Recent Legislation, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 1429 (1966).
5 0 OHIO REv. CODE § 5301.232-.233 (1967 CCH ADVANCE SESS. LAWS, SENATE
BILLS 605-07 (effective Nov. 24, 1967)), amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.23
(Page 1962).
51 Section 5301.232(E)(4) states:
A holder of a mortgage is "obligated" to make an advance if such holder
or the person to whom the repayment of such advance is owed has a contrac-
tual commitment to do so, even though the making of such advance may be
conditioned upon the occurrence or existence, or the failure to occur or exist,
of any event or fact, which event or fact must occur or exist or fail to occur or
exist within three years following the time the mortgage is delivered to the
recorder for record; provided, that such three-year limitation does not apply
to any mortgage given to secure, in whole or in part, loan advances made to
pay the cost of any construction, alteration, repair, improvement, enhance-
ment, or embellishment of any part of the mortgaged premises. Id. (empha-
sis added).
52 This is probably based upon the notion that a law should never be enforced if by
enforcing it the court would place one in breach of contract.
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that actual notice is necessary to defeat the priority,"a the court did
not feel "disposed to change the traditional Ohio rule."5  There
are equities in favor of both the majority and minority views" as to
whether or not there need be actual notice. But under the Ohio
rule of mere constructive notice, it does not seem an undue burden
for a mortgagee who is engaged in construction financing every day
to check the records before making further advances. It can be a
burden, however, on a mortgagee who has an interest in only one
or two parcels of land, and knows little of checking records.
The problem in Wayne is not so much whether actual or con-
structive notice is sufficient, as whether a mortgagee could, under
previous Ohio law, have made his advances obligatory. Taking
the court's opinion, a mortgage would have had to state that the
mortgagee was obliged to pay out a certain sum as certain conditions
were met. Added to this perhaps should have been a statement
noting that if the advances were not so made, the mortgagee would
be in breach of contract. Yet, even given these facts, it is not at all
clear from the Wayne opinion that the advances would have been
found obligatory. The court pointed out that though the assign-
ment of funds agreement subjected the disbursement of funds to the
rules and regulations of the building and loan company, the com-
pany never offered proof as to the content of the rules.56  One
would think that reasonable rules and regulations would have been
implied. The court's finding that the advances were not obligatory
appears to be merely a legal-sounding argument for defeating the
priority of a mortgagee whose carelessness in disbursing funds re-
sulted in prejudice to lienors who should have been subsequent in
priority.
The new amendment57 to the Ohio Revised Code does much to
53 11 Ohio St. 2d at 219, 228 N.E.2d at 857.
54 Id.
r For a discussion of this point see OsBoRNE § 119.
50 11 Ohio St. 2d at 221, 228 N.E.2d at 858.
57 The amendment reads in part:
(A) Whether or not it secures any other debt or obligation, a mortgage
may secure unpaid balances of loan advances made after the mortgage is de-
livered to the recorder for record, to the extent that the total unpaid loan in-
debtedness, exclusive of interest thereon, does not exceed the maximum amount
of loan indebtedness which the mortgage states may be outstanding at any
time. With respect to unpaid balances, division (3) of this section is appli-
cable if the mortgage states, in substance or effect, that the parties thereto in-
tend that the mortgage shall secure the same, the maximum amount of unpaid
loan indebtedness, exclusive of interest thereon, which may be outstanding at
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alleviate many of the problems that existed when the Wayne case
was decided. The new amendment requires the mortgage to state
the total indebtedness and that it is an open end mortgage, which
puts subsequent creditors on notice of the interests in the land. It
allows future advances to be secured when recorded. If the ad-
vances are optional, written notice will cause future advances to be
subsequent to the party's interest who gave the notice. If the ad-
vances are obligatory within the meaning of the section, there can
be no intervening encumbrances.
If the building and loan company's obligations to disburse
money to Yarborough could be considered obligatory under the
new amendment, then further legislation is needed to curb such
careless mortgagees who follow no statutory schemes in disburs-
ing funds. Perhaps the improvement mortgage section 1311.14
should be clarified by the legislature and made to apply to all mort-
gages whether recorded before or after the commencement of con-
struction. Subjecting the mortgagee to section 1311.14 would be
no hardship in that careful lenders would require the bills to be pre-
sented to them directly thus insuring that the laborers and material-
men would be paid. The burden should be on the mortgagee to
any time, and contains at the beginning thereof the words "OPEN-END
MORTGAGE".
(B) A mortgage complying with division (A) of this section and securing
unpaid balances of loan advances referred to in such division shall be a lien on
the premises described therein from the time such mortgage is delivered to the
recorder for record for the full amount of the total unpaid balances of such
advances that are made under such mortgage, plus interest thereon, regardless
of the time when such advances are made. If such an advance is made after
the holder of the mortgage receives written notice of a lien or encumbrance on
the mortgaged premises which is subordinate to the lien of the mortgage, and
if such holder is not obligated to make such advance at the time such notice
is received, then the lien of the mortgage for the unpaid balance of the ad-
vance so made shall be subordinate to such lien or encumbrance. If an ad-
vance is made after the holder of the mortgage receives written notice of work
or labor performed or to be performed or machinery, material, or fuel fur-
nished or to be furnished for the construction, alteration, repair, improvement,
enhancement, or embellishment of any part of the mortgaged premises and if
such holder is not obligated to make such advance at the time such notice is
received, then the lien of the mortgage for the unpaid balance of the advance
so made shall be subordinate to a valid mechanic's lien for the work or labor
actually furnished as specified in such notice.
(F) This section is not exclusive, does not apply to any mortgage filed or
recorded in conformity with section 1701.66 of the Revised Code, and does
not prohibit the use of other types of mortgages permitted by law. OHIO
REV. CODE 5 5301.232 (1967 CCHI ADvANcE SEss. LAws, SENATE BILLS
605-07 (effective Nov. 24, 1967)), amending OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.
23 (Page 1962) (emphasis added).
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make sure that the money which it disburses will be used in the
construction of the building, the purpose for which it was intended.
Though the Wayne court concerned itself with the obligatory-
nonobligatory distinction of the mortgage, it seems apparent that
the court was stretching the facts in order to avoid the clearly unjust
result which Ohio's peculiar statutory scheme would have dictated.
Rather than attempt to construe an apparent obligation as optional,
the courts should be able to make the decision reached in Wayne
on the basis that the monies were improperly disbursed so as to de-
prive mechanics' lienors of their fair compensation. But only if the
legislature further clarifies the mortgage statutes by setting out a
pattern of disbursement characteristics for all mortgagees, can the
courts place their decisions on such sound legal grounds.
LAWRENCE S. DOLIN
